$can$be$understood$partly$as$struggles$to$delineate$the$respective$ domains$of$different$authorities$in$global$governance.$Philip$Jessup$anticipated$a$version$of$this$ phenomenon$six$decades$ago$when$he$observed$that$lawGmaking$authority$is$effective$only$ when$other$authorities$recognize$and$give$effect$to$its$exercise.
18 $This$opens$up$a$fruitful$line$of$ inquiry,$which$Jessup$left$unexplored,$into$the$ways$in$which$one$actor's$lawGmaking$authority$ is$legitimated$by$other$authorities,$rendering$the$conflict$of$laws$inseparable$from$mutual$ construction$of$authority.$$
1.2# International#Arbitration#and#the#New#Lex$Mercatoria#
The$literature$on$international$commercial$arbitration$is$another$potential$source$of$ perspectives$on$TBGI.$International$commerce$is$hailed$by$some$as$generating$a$new$lex) mercatoria$created$by$and$for$transnational$business$and$built$on$the$principle$of$parties'$ autonomy$to$choose$which$norms$will$govern$their$crossGborder$dealings$with$each$other$and$ who$will$adjudicate$their$disputes.$The$nature$and$extent$of$interaction$between$this$normative$ order$and$state$law$are$central$subjects$of$academic$debate$in$this$field,$including$the$ circumstances$in$which$national$courts$should$be$able$to$set$aside$arbitral$awards.$Proponents$ of$this$new$legal$order$typically$strive$to$minimize$such$interaction$by$insisting$that$the$new$law$ merchant$is$an$autonomous$legal$order$that$is$and$ought$to$be$prior$to$and$independent$from$ state$law,$and$that$the$latter$should$intervene$in$this$nonGstate$legal$order$only$in$very$limited$ circumstances.
19 $Others$including$Peer$Zumbansen$remind$us 20 $that$the$lex)mercatoria,$like$ 'private'$ordering$generally,$is$inextricably$embedded$in$state$legal$systems$with$each$ simultaneously$governing$and$being$governed$by$the$other.
$$
InvestorGstate$arbitration$under$international$investment$treaties$is$a$particularly$ controversial$example$of$interaction$between$nonGstate$and$state$authority,$because$it$is$a$site$ for$contestation$of$states'$sovereign$regulatory$choices. 22 $to$the$point$that$they$are$better$ described$as$'strict$controllers'$than$'gentle$civilizers'$of$nations.
28 $$
1.3# Public#International#Law#
Public$international$law$scholarship,$for$its$part,$has$long$emphasized$the$interaction$ between$international$and$domestic$law,$whether$as$separate$systems 29 $Extending$regulatory$competition$analysis$ to$transnational$governance$raises$several$questions,$including$whether$and$when$the$ conditions$for$competition$exist$in$domains$in$which$jurisdiction$is$not$defined$territorially$and$ regulators$cannot$necessarily$require$all$actors$within$their$jurisdiction$to$adhere$to$their$ standards.$In$these$circumstances,$regulatory$cooperation$or$competition$may$be$determined$ by$forces$other$than$factor$mobility.$$ Transnational$regulatory$competition$also$raises$questions$about$legitimacy$and$ regulatory$races.$Errol$Meidinger,$for$example,$predicts$that$competition$among$schemes$for$ acceptance$will$create$pressure$to$adopt$standards$that$respond$to$or$even$anticipate$public$ demands,$leading$toward$more$transparent,$participatory$processes$and$more$ambitious$and$ effective$rules. 
